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Abstract 
Technological innovation and consequential 
decentralisation are driving forces in the ongoing 
evolution and increasing openness of digital 
infrastructures and services. One of the most 
discussed and allegedly disruptive innovations is the 
distributed  database technology referred to as 
blockchain. Although it is still in its technological 
infancy, experimental adoption and customization 
seem to be in full progress in various potential fields 
of application ranging from decentralized grids for 
computation and storage to global financial services. 
However, the technology and its path of development 
still entail a lot of common unknowns for 
practitioners and researchers alike. Especially 
regarding the question how the technology could 
amend or be incorporated into the existing landscape 
of digital services, processes and infrastructures. 
Hence, in this article we develop an ontology that (1) 
clearly delineates common terminology, core 
concepts and components, their relationships as well 
as innovative features of blockchain technology. It 
further (2) connects these insights with implications 
for relevant types of digital market models. Our 
framework is of high theoretical and practical value 
as it provides researchers and practitioners a 
common basis for communication and means for 
guided analysis of blockchain applicability. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Identification and valid analysis of blockchain 
ecosystems and application scenarios impose a 
prevailing issue for practitioners and researchers. 
Despite many discussions, press releases and talks 
about blockchain technology, few truly and fully 
understand or can actually describe with certainty the 
basic or innovative features introduced by blockchain 
technology. This most likely also holds true for cross-
disciplinary researchers from non-technical 
disciplines. Reasons might be the complex interplay 
of blockchain components and resulting properties 
that are hard to grasp in detail as well as the lack of a 
solid common knowledge base, especially in 
information systems (IS). The most recent publicly 
available blockchain instantiations, e.g. Ethereum, 
comprise a decentralized peer-to-peer network, a 
built-in public-key infrastructure, cryptographically 
enabled data structures for storing transactions as 
well as data attached to transactions and include a 
Turing complete programming language based on a 
replicated virtual machine. Each of these components 
can be itself quite complex to understand, especially 
for business, economic, social and political science 
researchers and practitioners.  
Additionally, blockchain systems introduce new 
ways of decentralisation and delegation of services 
into the hands of autonomous interacting pieces of 
code, also referred to as smart contracts. These 
autonomous and hence trust-free setups also attack 
current trust establishing institutions and 
intermediaries, such as banks or market place 
operators. Incumbent role and business models in 
digital ecosystems might no longer apply in the 
context of blockchain systems. These circumstances 
lead to confusion and uncertainty regarding actual 
use cases and their technological and economical 
validity. 
It comes with no surprise that an established and 
often cited phrase related to blockchain technology 
states that "blockchain is an innovative technology in 
search of use cases".  
Nonetheless, potential use cases and their 
implications are frequently discussed by a variety of 
researchers, practitioners and governmental 
institutions alike. The current focus of the discussion 
is primarily associated with financial market 
infrastructure and related services, e.g. payments and 
post-trading. The likely reason for this single focused 
attention and media coverage is the allegedly 
disruptive potential of the technology for the 
financial sector. This storyline is currently rephrased 
by nearly every major bank [36] or consulting 
company [4] as well as central banks [17] and 
financial market authorities [8]. Its potential impact is 
often compared to the impact the internet had on 
global interconnectedness in societal as well as 
business environments. 
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However, the how and why regarding these use 
cases is often missing in the discussions or 
descriptions which are often limited to an abstract 
and opaque level. 
From a practical perspective, the accelerating 
process of decentralisation of services in areas like 
retail payment services [5] and asset management can 
hence be seen to be only a precursor of uprising 
scenarios for services in supply chain management, 
insurance, digital knowledge management, e-business 
and e-commerce. These developments are further 
pushed by societal trends towards a networked 
society [10] and platform-mediated services. Clients 
become increasingly connected as highly available, 
reliable network infrastructure is common even for 
retail customers. Thus, the need for intermediaries 
providing solid and reliable service infrastructure 
while leveraging economies of scale is diminishing 
with an increasing global digitization and 
interconnectedness.  
These environmental developments in 
combination with digital innovation in form of 
blockchain technology probably hold opportunities to 
create and integrate new services and business 
models into the existing digital economy. Digital 
innovation life cycles can be described by four 
phases as reviewed by [11]: discovery, development, 
diffusion, impact. Discovery of blockchain 
technology can be dated to 2015 when the majority of 
financial institutions publicly announced interest into  
the innovation. Given that there are almost daily 
announcements in the news media of prototypes and 
tests by companies from various industries, the 
development phase is probably reached. According to 
[11] the relevant managerial questions arising during 
theses phases are "What constitutes the digital 
innovation's core feature set?", "To what potential 
organizational uses can it be put?", "What 
complementary products and services are needed to 
flesh out the 'whole product solution'?", "what other 
elements (organizational, technological) comprise a 
sound innovation system incorporating the digital 
innovation?". 
We summarise these relevant managerial 
questions by formulating the following research 
question: How can blockchain (eco)systems and 
associated roles be described and analysed in the 
context of digital economies? 
Against the backdrop of the outlined situation, the 
overall goal of this paper is twofold. First, by 
providing a comprehensive conceptual framework we 
aim to support practitioners to evaluate use cases, 
new business models and roles in the existing, 
evolving and emerging blockchain ecosystems. 
Second, the framework provides cross-disciplinary 
researchers and practitioners with a structured 
knowledge base and a common vocabulary regarding 
terms, concepts and their relationships as well as 
roles that is in line with  the blockchain development 
community domain.  It provides an ubiquitous 
language for blockchain system contexts. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section two provides a brief overview of the 
background of the technology and fundamental 
definitions. This also entails a review of related 
literature on blockchain technology in information 
systems. In section three we explain our research 
approach and methodology. Section four comprises 
the development of the conceptual framework. 
Section five contains a critical review of our results 
before we conclude and provide an outlook for future 
research in section six. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.2 Related Literature 
 
The attention to blockchain technology as well as 
Cryptocurrencies is still quite limited in the discipline 
of information systems. This is astonishing as 
practitioners, especially in the finance and insurance 
sector are relentlessly working on the identification 
of reasonable use cases and timely technological 
validation in form of prototypes based on different 
blockchain technologies [43]. 
Although the adoption has already begun, due to 
the fact that almost all systems are open source, 
adoption can be more complicated as only recently 
emphasized by [12]. 
A common limitation of previous work on 
blockchain technology is that it is either sticking to a 
mono-disciplinary perspective, e.g. cryptographic 
security [28], consensus algorithms [23], economics 
[3], or focuses specific cryptocurrencies which are 
only a single purpose instantiation of a blockchain 
system [20].  
The truly innovative character of the technology, 
however, is its openness and technologically driven 
capability to pervade multiple vertical layers of 
digital ecosystem infrastructure. Pervasiveness can 
span the backend database, the business logic, up to 
the organisational layers due to smart contracts' 
capabilities in form of autonomous rule and process 
representation. However, it is quite difficult to 
capture all these different and complex layers  into a 
single perspective. The design science approach of 
[2] provides a first glimpse at the potential economic 
implications of these systems. 
Consequently, the focus of this study is to derive 
a conceptual framework that unifies blockchain 
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concepts and their relationships to digital market 
models into a single framework. This way, it guides 
researchers and practitioners in their analyses of 
blockchain systems research and application. We 
focus on the general purpose of information systems 
research discipline by describing and analysing the 
interdependencies between IT artifacts and their 
interaction with socio-technical systems [18].  
In the context of information systems literature, 
we follow the call of [37] who request "(1) deeper 
theoretical work on the notion of infrastructures, (2) 
new theoretical lenses to understand the paradoxical 
nature of change and control in digital infrastructures, 
and (3) better understanding of the ways in which 
infrastructural change shapes IT governance, IS 
development, and promotes new effects across all 
levels of analysis." 
 
3. Research Design 
 
Theorizing in IS provides a variety of paths to be 
followed as summarised by [13]. Descriptive 
theories, i.e. theories that state "what is", are needed 
when very little is known about the phenomenon in 
question. Ontologies provide a framework for 
structured knowledge representation [19, 16]. They 
establish concepts and their relationships in a specific 
knowledge domain  to facilitate communication and 
collaboration in the explicit context of that domain 
[15]. Different variations of this type of theory are 
classification schemata, conceptual frameworks and 
taxonomies [13].  
We rely on the description of basic components of 
an ontology as declared by [39]. According to them 
an ontology necessarily includes a vocabulary of 
terms and specifications of their meaning, i.e. 
definitions. We aim to construct a semi-formal 
ontology as described by [39] which primarily 
consists of textual descriptions. It provides the basis 
to derive the influence of the blockchain induced 
pervasive decentralisation on different levels of the 
digital infrastructure as well as market models. 
One example for this type of approach is the work 
of [20]. They outline potential impacts of 
cryptocurrencies on digital payment system platforms 
and services. In contrast, however, our study explores 
a broader, more general scope of digital market 
models in the context of blockchain. Hence, we 
achieve a higher generalisability of obtained results, 
i.e. a more general applicability, as our framework is 
not bound to a single service domain. 
Our approach is divided into four consecutive 
steps. First, we delineate the core concepts and 
features of blockchain systems and split blockchain 
systems into two logical layers. Second, we induct 
implications for the digital infrastructure and the 
governance of blockchain systems as well as general 
implications of pervasive decentralisation. Third, we 
derive the impact on digital market models. 
 
4. Ontology Development 
 
The subsequent analyses and ontology 
development is primarily based on the most 
comprehensive resource available for smart contract 
systems, i.e. the documentation of the Ethereum 
blockchain. We rely on the yellow paper [42] which 
describes the technology in detail. For vocabulary 
and concept naming we rely on the github 
documentation (https://github.com/ethereum/wiki) 
and the Ethereum blog (https://blog.ethereum.org). 
Concepts of the ontology are formatted italic. 
 
4.2 Blockchain System Concepts and 
Relationships 
 
We start with the definitions of a common set of 
blockchain components and relationships as a first 
part of our blockchain ontology.  
Basically, a blockchain is a distributed, 
transactional database. Globally distributed nodes 
are linked by a peer-to-peer (P2P) communication 
network with its own layer of protocol messages for 
node communication and peer discovery. Nodes 
identify each other by their IP address and users 
reference each other via their public key. The 
corresponding private key of a user is used to 
cryptographically sign messages and transactions 
(Tx). Put differently, he authorises them by 
cryptographically assuring that they represent his 
intention. 
A node is a physical/virtual machine that 
communicates via TCP/IP and UDP with other 
nodes. In contrast, a user is only represented by a 
public key address and could theoretically login from 
any other node. This is possible as each of the nodes 
maintains a database of all historical, valid 
transactions that have been sent between the nodes of 
the network. Transactions are grouped into blocks. 
Every block references the previous block of 
transactions and hence a temporal ordering of 
transactions is achieved. Order of transactions within 
a block are determined by a randomly selected node 
in line with the applied consensus algorithm. Light 
client nodes are configured such that they only 
collect the hashes of blocks of transactions to safe 
disk space and make the services available on less 
performant devices like smartphones. 
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Every blockchain's core functionality is to provide 
validated, immutable transactions, i.e. database 
updates, that are consistent between a large number 
of nodes in a global network. Blockchains use 
complex data structures (e.g. merkle trees or patricia 
merkle trees) to efficiently store all transactions in a 
way that the current state of the system inherently 
depends on all previous transactions. Thus, changes 
(e.g. manipulations) to historical transactions in a 
single node result in invalid states if one would 
recalculate the current state from all historical 
transactions. If a node then proposes its transactions 
which are identified as invalid by other nodes, the 
node proposing invalid transactions will be ignored 
by the other nodes in the system as it is inconsistent 
(i.e. it violates the protocol) with the other nodes. For 
the sake of brevity, we refer to [28, 42, 27] for a more 
detailed description of these data structures. 
It is worth noting, that the meaning of the word 
transaction can be ambiguous in the context of a 
blockchain. On the one hand, a blockchain is a 
database and in this traditional context it can simply 
mean the update of data in the database. On the other 
hand, a blockchain often facilitates the transfer of 
tokens, where a transaction then refers to the transfer 
of tokens from one user to another user. Tokens are 
either inherent to the system or implemented in 
higher layer scripting or programming languages. 
Most implementations feature a built-in scripting 
language which is able, in a very limited way, similar 
to stored procedures in traditional databases, to 
execute additional business logic triggered by a 
transaction. More recent generations of the 
technology, for example Ethereum and Hyperledger, 
extend the basic idea of a scripting language by 
integrating a fully fledged programming language 
executed by an internal virtual machine. These 
programming languages have also access to complex 
data types and data structures and even small, locally 
separated databases that can be used to store and 
retrieve data. The code is deployed into the 
blockchain database at every node and can be 
triggered by certain transaction events. This enables 
far more possibilities than transactions of tokens as 
cryptocurrencies were intended to do. 
These pieces of code are often referred to as 
smart contracts. Although, the notion of a contract is 
somewhat misleading. The origin of that notion dates 
Figure 1. Blockchain System Concepts and Relaitionships 
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back to the idea of code-based self-executing legal 
contracts as described by [34]. However, for purposes 
of consistency we keep the notion of smart contracts.  
Smart contract execution can be compared to 
atomic transactions, i.e., the transition from the 
current database state to the next database state by 
changing data. If one part of the code execution fails, 
the whole transaction fails and the next state is not 
reached. Execution time is limited in an economical 
way, i.e. you have to pay for execution time. This 
prevents nodes from executing one smart contract 
infinitely. As the state transition, i.e., smart contract 
code execution is performed on every node in the 
network, infinite execution would put the whole 
blockchain system to halt. One consequence is that 
smart contracts cannot trigger themselves as this 
would require that they are continuously executed. 
There is no self-execution at a certain point in time or 
environmental event without explicit external 
intervention. This is a common misunderstanding of 
how these systems operate. 
Blockchain systems currently face some other 
technical limitations: Capacity, latency and query 
capabilities are quite limited in comparison to other 
distributed database systems as described by [24]. 
However, these constraints are likely to be of 
transient nature and further improvements and future 
innovations are probably able to solve current 
limitations. For the sake of brevity we leave technical 
limitations aside during our analysis. 
Figure 1 depicts the previous conceptual descriptions 
to provide a comprehensive overview of generic 
blockchain system components and relationships.  
In the next two sections we review blockchain system 
infrastructure, define concepts and relations and 
derive implications for digital infrastructures. We 
then discuss the implications for digital market 
models. 
 
4.2. Pervasive Decentralisation of Digital 
Infrastructure 
 
We start with further dividing blockchain systems 
into two layers of code. The first layer is the so called 
fabric layer, which is a common concept in the 
global blockchain development community. The 
fabric layer denotes the actual blockchain code base 
that comprises the communication layer, the public-
key infrastructure, the data structures to construct and 
maintain the database as well as the execution 
environment for smart contract languages. The 
second layer comprises the application logic of 
services implemented in form of smart contracts. We 
refer to the second layer as application layer. 
Services based on one or more smart contracts are 
commonly called Decentralised Applications 
(DApps). Figure 2 visualises the different layers.  
A remarkable fact worth noting is, that the system 
spans across multiple layers of traditional n-Tier 
architectures. This is the reason for the technology's 
pervasiveness and has far reaching implications as we 
will discuss later. 
The Fabric Layer. It is crucial to note, that there 
is a strong centralisation of control of the fabric layer. 
Whoever develops and maintains the fabric layer is in 
ultimate control of the whole system's functioning. 
Even if he cannot directly modify the state of the 
system as represented by the blockchain database. 
If the fabric layer is developed by a single company 
and the code base is not open source, the whole 
system will always be in the hand of this company. If 
it is kept open source, the organization of developers 
and maintenance of the code is more complex. We 
refer to [6, 14, 25, 22] for background on open source 
communities. This is also something that needs to be 
considered in the context of software system adoption 
by corporations as is emphasized by [26].  
The fabric layer fulfills basic services. Databases 
usually come with an integrated module to manage 
different types of users  that can have different levels 
of permissions. For example, a user might only be 
able to read certain subsets of the database and is not 
allowed to send any transactions, i.e., changes to the 
data. A super user, however, usually has the full set 
of rights or can grant them. Blockchain systems, so 
far, make no differentiation between users and user 
management modules only provide rudimentary 
functionality like account creation and basic 
password management.  
This also implies that every user has full 
transparency regarding the transactions and deployed 
smart contract code of other blockchain system users.  
In a setup, however, where only a set of 
permissioned users can see and validate transactions 
and blocks, privacy is no longer an issue if 
permissioned parties would see the content in a 
traditional setup as well. This permissioned 
blockchain system or private blockchain is in stark 
Figure 2. Layers of Blockchain Systems 
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contrast to the idea of public blockchains like Bitcoin 
or Ethereum. However, for testing purposes and 
business setups it is the primary choice. 
Hybrid systems are currently discussed as well, 
however, at the time of writing there is no public 
hybrid system live and running. Ripple could be 
considered a hybrid system, although it does not 
maintain a blockchain of transactions in the fashion 
we described. From an economic perspective, a 
private permissioned system merely resembles an 
intra- or inter-group technology upgrade. If there is 
no trust issue among nodes with respect to validity of 
database updates the only reason to opt for a 
blockchain is its immutable log of historical 
transactions for audibility purposes. 
In an economic context, a hybrid system enables a 
restricted set of users to access the services. Hence a 
hybrid blockchain can be considered a club good. 
Users are excludable from the system but the 
admitted users have no further restrictions with 
respect to usage of the systems services.  
A public blockchain, on the contrary, resembles a 
public good. That is, users are non-excludable from 
its services and there is no rivalry among users. If 
there is rivalry for some reason, it could be 
considered a common good. If public blockchains 
enable basic services like car or citizenship registry, 
the government would be responsible for provision 
and maintenance of fabric layer. Provision of public 
goods is a complex undertaking [40] people building 
the system might get no rewards besides the system 
itself and others may use it for free without 
contributing. It can be incentivised by so called 
dominant assurance contracts as proposed by [35]. 
The literature regarding the economics of goods is 
actually quite vast. We refer to [21] for an overview.  
Besides, a completely open setup, where any user can 
join if he can install the fabric layer software, 
introduces potential issues regarding regulations of 
service provision. For example, in the case of a 
payment service, anti money-laundering and know 
your customer processes are required by regulation 
and hinder adoption, especially in the financial sector 
[8, 9]. 
The Application Layer. So far we discussed the 
levels of decentralisation of the fabric layer which is 
comprising the blockchain system itself. We will now 
discuss the implications of decentralisation of the 
application layer in more detail. 
The blockchain itself is developed by a group of 
architects and developers and hence is always under 
control of these development teams. 
On the contrary, the code of the application layer 
can be written and bound to the system by any 
participant. The code itself is then under control of 
the participant who deployed the piece of code. It 
follows, that the control at the application layer is 
distributed among the participants who deployed the 
code. 
Once the system is running, open to the public 
and users start deploying their own code onto the 
blockchain system, the developers of the fabric layer 
are no longer in control of what is actually happening 
on top of the system, i.e. within the application layer.  
Consequently, the control of the application layer 
is pushed into the hands of a decentralised user space 
and its control is equally decentralised. The code of 
smart contracts, can be built in such a way, that the 
control is entirely left over to the piece of code 
deployed. If a transaction contains such smart 
contract code, a new participant (address) is 
registered in the system. The new participant is the 
smart contract and has its own address in form of a 
public address. If there is no access control 
mechanism implemented by the participant who 
deployed the smart contract, the code becomes 
autonomous. This leads to a setup where only the 
piece of code itself 'determines' what happens when it 
is triggered, based on the programmed rules it 
contains. Hence, participants can hand over decision 
making to an autonomously deciding piece of 
software that is accessible for other participants of 
the system.  
The resulting decentralisation of control in 
combination with the immutable representation of 
transfer of possession or, more generally, speaking 
the transition of system states, leads to the common 
notion of 'trustless systems'. These can be build on 
the application layer. 
An immediate consequence is that business logic 
based on smart contracts can use the blockchain 
system with all its features in an autonomous way. 
Put differently, smart contracts can represent the 
business logic, e.g. market mechanisms or decision 
making and in addition communicate with each other, 
i.e., call or trigger each other. They can hence create 
a web of tiny services that enable the creation and 
autonomous activity of very complex systems. 
However, recall that the activity must always be 
triggered by an external impulse. A smart contract 
could, for example, realise a service that maintains a 
small database accessible only by this contract. It 
could evaluate data attached to a transaction and 
trigger further transactions to other users or smart 
contracts. Hence, smart contracts could implement 
autonomous market mechanisms or complex micro-
service interactions which, in total, realise more 
sophisticated service logic like an autonomous 
portfolio management service. In summary, 
autonomous service provision in combination with 
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trustless setups of smart contracts could replace trust 
intermediaries. 
It is worth noting here, that any information that 
is not generated by a transaction has to be introduced 
as data attached to a transaction. This also holds for 
time events. Put differently, any activity in the 
system needs to be triggered by a node controlled 
from outside of the network (which of course can be 
another software system). This is a functional 
limitation to be kept in mind. 
The basic set of blockchain functionalities enables 
users to transact whatever is represented by the built-
in tokens of the blockchain system. However, tokens 
can also be represented by a smart contract as a 
mapping of user addresses to an account balance 
stored in the smart contract. That is, when the smart 
contract transfers any amount of the token to a 
another it does so by setting an entry into its local 
database which represents the amount and the user 
address. Note that this is equivalent to what a bank 
does if it credits a certain amount of a currency to a 
customer's account. Consequently, these tokens could 
also be maintained autonomously by the smart 
contract.  
However, merely the technical creation of the 
token does not attach any value to it. The platform 
openness of public blockchains influences this 
dimension of value representation in blockchain 
based ecosystems as we discuss next. If an 
ecosystem, comprised of the services interacting on 
the application layer, is self-sufficient in an 
economical sense of value transaction, it can be 
considered self-contained or closed. That is, if 
services in the system only rely upon other services 
or information generated within the system. We 
provide an example for such a system setup in the 
context of the internet of things. Assume that spare 
parts which are delivered by autonomous drones can 
be paid with the electricity produced by the spare part 
purchaser's energy plants. These services could 
interact without exchanging with other ecosystems as 
they are directly offsetting each other. If this is the 
case, value, or valuable services are created within 
the system and can also be redeemed or spent within 
the system. Such a closedness of the ecosystem 
implies that there is no need to bind  to external 
systems in order to exchange information or tokens 
of any value. Users and services can rely on 
internally issued tokens in order to interoperate, i.e. 
use the token as a medium for exchange. An extreme 
scenario would be that a whole economy is 
represented on a blockchain system. for example, the 
ecosystem of an online multiplayer game. It follows 
that the higher the closedness of the ecosystem, the 
more suitable is a blockchain infrastructure. 
The other case would be that frequent interaction 
with external services is needed in order to bind any 
value to the system. In that case, the decentralisation 
of control ends at the boundaries to other systems and 
the full potential of autonomous smart contracts can 
no longer be leveraged. The binding interoperation 
then introduces trust into the external institution and 
the interface(s) the system needs to be bound to. For 
example, if we build a payment system and there is 
no way to purchase goods or services with the 
internal token, then we need an exchange to transfer 
the token into a valuable currency. We then have a 
trusted interface to the issuer of the outside currency 
to be valuable and stable in value. 
Furthermore, the actual types of services, and the 
market mechanisms (provided on the application 
layer) by which these services are priced determine 
the relevant roles in such an ecosystem. The major 
difference to current digital market models is, 
however, the possible decentralisation of 
intermediaries by autonomous DApps. Hence, 
fundamental question becomes whether the 
traditional roles of digital market models can be 
delegated to an autonomous piece of code. For an 
overview of roles and market models in the context 
of digital platforms we refer to [38] and will discuss 
the implications in the next section.  
 Previous considerations also introduce 
collaboration on different levels, either in form of 
standardization of smart contract interfaces or the 
standardization of complete services and process 
interoperability. For incumbent digital services and 
standardization we refer to [30]. However, the design 
of digital services itself can be quite sophisticated 
and several dimensions have to be taken into account 
according to the findings of [41].  
 
Table 1. Applicability Analysis Framework 
 
Layer Dimension Considerations 
F
a
b
ri
c 
L
a
y
er
 
Governance 
Type 
 Club Good 
 Common Good 
 Public Good 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 L
a
y
er
 
Ecosystem 
Closedness 
 Self-Contained 
 Trusted Interfaces 
Value Linking 
 Community 
Currency 
 Debt/Equity 
Issuance 
 Commercial Bank 
 Central Bank 
Market Type 
 Multi-sided 
 Collaborative 
 P2P 
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 These considerations further lead to the known 
critical mass dilemma in a multi-sided market [32] if 
the adoption by either service providers or customers 
is low. Both, customers as well as services providers 
are needed simultaneously in order to achieve a 
critical mass and subsequently a high level of  
closedness of the system. 
The discussion so far is also tightly related to the 
real-world problem of how currency actually 
becomes valuable. This problem is usually solved by 
trust in a system of central banks as well as 
commercial banks. However, other ideas have been 
around for several decades, e.g. free banking systems 
where the same currency varies in value dependent 
on the bank that issued the note or coin [33]. Another 
possibility is a community currency which resembles 
to the setup of a closed ecosystem. 
The traditional ways of binding an ecosystem to 
valuable tokens, i.e., database entries are commercial 
bank money and central bank money issuance. A 
fundamental game changer for a blockchain system 
emerges if a bank directly provides value backing of 
blockchain issued tokens, e.g. by issuing commercial 
bank money on the blockchain. The closedness of the 
system becomes irrelevant, as one can use the 
commercial money token as medium to the outside 
world. It does not make any difference if the token is 
the inherent token of the respective blockchain 
system or a token that is issued by a smart contract 
controlled by the bank. This setup would practically 
solve the problem of ecosystem or value binding with 
traditional means. However, the needed trust in 
institutions is, then again, necessary at the trusted 
interfaces. 
Another possibility of ecosystem value linking 
would be a central bank backing of one or more 
tokens of the system. This would leverage the 
position of a central bank, which is coupled directly 
to the economy of one or more nations. Although this 
would facilitate the diffusion and ease of use of 
blockchain systems, it would, once again, introduce 
the hierarchies and links to institutional trust of the 
current financial system. The question boils down to 
whether a single central governmental authority or 
multiple private institutions are the preferable option 
if community currency or ecosystem closedness are 
not applicable. Actual discussions by central banks 
regarding digital currency issuance became public 
only recently [7, 31]. 
 
4.4. Implications for Digital Platforms and 
Market Models  
 
Blockchain technology is by design a multi user 
system. It is designed for continuous, non-centrally 
governed interaction among (large) heterogeneous 
groups of participants. Furthermore, it supports the 
independent development and deployment of 
autonomous, collaborative and highly interoperable 
services by every user of the system. Against the 
backdrop of these core capabilities we 
consequentially narrow our perspective on digital 
market models to those likely to provide valid use 
cases for blockchains. A market model should rely 
upon these kinds of participant groups and also 
interaction among them. We have identified three 
types of market models that match these criteria, 
namely multi-sided, collaborative and P2P markets 
[1]. 
Multi-sided markets are characterised by the 
interaction of multiple parties with different interests 
in a single market mechanism [29]. Usually, 
intermediaries provide services of information or 
product brokerage in the role of platform providers. 
Examples are credit cards and stock exchanges. The 
role of intermediaries is at stake in blokchain based 
ecosystems. They are subject to decentralisation by 
autonomous DApps if the service is of transactional 
character and of low complexity. 
Collaborative markets are equally characterised 
by multiple parties interacting on platforms which 
provide basic means of exchange for information or 
goods. Examples are open source software or open 
knowledge (e.g. wikipedia) platforms. As these types 
of platforms or markets are already open and often 
closed ecosystems they provide suitable candidates to 
profit  from blockchain infrastructure. As payments 
for contributions are an issue that could be solved by 
blockchain infrastructure. 
P2P markets are natural candidates to profit from 
blockchain infrastructure due to their high ecosystem 
closedness. Blockchain systems could provide the 
infrastructure to decentralise intermediary services 
and means of trustless payments in comparison to 
current systems. Examples are Foodsharing, 
Couchsurfing, P2P-Lending and Filesharing. 
The last artifact of our ontology is table 1 and 
summarises the four dimensions that should be 
covered during a blockchain applicability analysis. It 
can be applied by reproducing our considerations in 
the last two sections in an explicit business domain. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Our framework development has shown that there are 
two imminent implications from an economic 
perspective. First, the platform providers underlying 
all market models could be replaced by decentralised 
blockchain systems. Especially if their services are 
neither highly complex nor computational intensive. 
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For example crowdfunding, or crowdinvesting 
platform providers in collaborative markets and 
platform providers in multi-sided markets, e.g. Uber 
or AirBnb. 
Second, trusted third-party service providers 
replacement in multi-sided markets might be limited 
fit due to the governance centralisation of the fabric 
layer. Additional conditions must be considered to 
make it an attractive alternative to a central third-
party. The economic incentives of the fabric layer 
governance party must be in line with the application 
layer party. This relationship should also be rather 
stable over time in order to ensure long term support 
for the ecosystem. This argumentation is not limited 
to any market model. Decentralisation and hence 
trust decentralisation is only as good as the most 
basic layer - the fabric layer. 
With our ontology we contribute to theory in 
general by introducing an ontology for the domain of 
blockchain systems. The framework and its 
development process provide in-depth knowledge on 
blockchain systems in general and their influence on 
the digital ecosystems in particular. We further 
contribute to the literature on strategic frameworks 
that identify new sources of value creation in form of 
digital product platforms [44]. The framework is also 
of high practical relevance due to its guiding 
capabilities for the analysis of blockchain use cases. 
 
6. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
The initially stated goal of this work is to derive a 
framework that (1) provides a common basis of 
concepts for the domain of blockchain systems and 
(2) can be applied by researchers and practitioners to 
assess the implications of Blockchain technology in 
various economic and academic contexts. In this 
work we develop an ontology that describes common 
components of blockchain systems and proposes a 
common vocabulary for communication. We further 
introduce the perspective of pervasive 
decentralisation of multiple layers of digital 
infrastructure by blockchain technology. Finally, we 
outline implications for market models in the digital 
economy, that are likely to be affected by blockchain 
systems. 
Interoperability is key in any e-Business 
environment. Blockchain infrastructure has the 
potential to contribute due to its pervasive, 
decentralised and open design. Future research could 
hence focus on how blockchain systems can be 
leveraged for better interoperability in electronic 
markets. 
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